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AN ASSESSMENT OF ISRAEL’S MILITARY CAPABILITY
Joi Sullivan

Oil and Islam. When juxtaposed, these words scream the Middle East, more
than any other region in the world. Because these aspects of Middle Eastern
culture and politics are entrenched into modern day life and are consistently
interacting, they continuously and relatively overtly play a part in the stability
of the region. In the northwest side of the region that makes up the Middle
East, one can find the crux of religious clashes. Amidst the primarily Islamic
countries in that area, lies one outlier, Israel. The country of Israel, with its
Jewish heritage and narrow landscape, wedged between Lebanon, Syria, Jordan,
Egypt and the Mediterranean Sea, seems to be a David in the midst of a col
lective Goliath. During decades of violence with nearby countries, the small
country of Israel has proven to be capable militarily to not only force ceasefires,
but also dominate in terms of military prowess in a region marked by economic
prosperity allowed by oil monopolies in Islamic countries. Events such as the
War of 1948 and the Six Day War in 1967 have shown Israel, when completely
outnumbered and seemingly headed into total decimation, managing to not
only scrape by, but thrive and succeed in their military engagements.
In a time where military technology is developing at supersonic rate and
the Middle East is ravaged by conflict, Israel continues to display superior
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military aptitude. This coupled with continuous technological developments
demands a further assessment of Israel’s military capability as it relates to the
region around them. The remaining discussion will posit that while using com
prehensive definitions of power, due to technological developments, manpower,
economic strength and external support, Israel’s current military capability is
exceptional and has a consequential impact on the world at large.
Military Capability
The conceptualization of military capability is extensive at the least. It mandates
a thorough definition of power and an analysis of relative power in order to
be an all encompassing concept. The theoretical paradigm of realism defines
states’ main interests as power, and further divides power into two categories:
hard power and soft power. Hard power is that which is tangible, primarily
military artillery and number of soldiers. Conversely, soft power is epitomized
in monetary value and influence in various realms.1 One invaluable resource
concerning indicators of power is the Correlates of War project (COW) which
was created in 1963, to provide an “accumulation of scientific knowledge”
concerning war through the conceptualization of a “state” and a “war”.2
Power is often defined as “control over resources, control over actors, and
control over events and outcomes.”3 In this project specifically, indicators of
military power primarily included factors such as “material resources and in
dustrial capacity” but wrongfully excluded things such as potential to mobilize
people and “geo-strategic bargaining leverage”.4 While COW includes some
factors that are non-conventional, military power as defined solely by resource
numbers and capacity is misleading. It fails to address key aspects of military
prowess. A country can have millions of soldiers but have less advanced tech
nology, thereby putting them at a lower ranking in terms of world military
power. One of the fundamental indicators of military capability is latent power,
the ability to turn assets of the population into military power particularly
1
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because military power is impossible to possess without wealth.5 Also, the
percent of GDP per capita spent on the military is indicative of how high of a
priority military development is.6 It is rather logical and clear that those with
military development as a high priority generally have the most military power.
Additionally, while COW chooses to ignore military power in terms of ability
to mobilize, with Israel in particular, it is necessary to address the complexity
of its compulsory draft and how the ability to mobilize thousands of people
affects their capability to succeed in military engagements.
Measuring military power must be executed through a means of comparison.
The relative gains of one country compared to another country can reveal a great
deal about the increase, decrease or stagnation of any one country’s military
capability.7 Also, the ability for a state to carry out its military intentions even
with resistance contributes to the total military capability of a country.8 These
factors, though seemingly unconventional and rather abstract, do play a rather
large role in not only the level of military capability a state has, but also the
way in which the world perceives the threat of a specific state. The assessment
of the military capability of a state as compared to its historical capabilities
and other states indicates reasoning behind its interactions and justifications
for action in the international realm. With these acknowledgements about the
complexity of military power, this paper will assess the military capability of
Israel and determine its level of competitiveness and strength as compared to
the past and the present.
Manpower
When Israel declared its independence in 1948, it enacted compulsory military
service for all men and women that reach the age of eighteen. Voluntary service
is allowed at the age of seventeen.9 This encompasses all children of Israelis
including those who were born in Israel and left the country when they were
“Microsoft Word - Mearsheimer2001.doc - Mearsheimer2001.pdf,” accessed March 21, 2014.
Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, Handbook of International Relations
(SAGE, 2002).
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young. Currently, because of this compulsory draft, 3.8 million Israeli men and
women are available for military service, although only about 2.9 million men
and women are actually fit for service.10 There used to be major exceptions to the
compulsory draft law, one which related to a particular religious group within
Israel. The Haredim, or the ultra-Orthodox Jews of Israel, were provided an
exception to the rule if they were studying in seminary full time. However, in
March of 2014, the Israeli government removed that exception and mandated
the draft of a certain quota of this group of people, only allowing 1800 of the
group to escape the draft. The Haredim make up 10% of Israel’s 7.8 million
people, making them 780,000 strong.11 If 1800 are given exceptions to this
new draft law that leaves 778,200 to be available for mobilization. While that
number is rather small in comparison to the 3.8 million available for military
service, it still contributes a large degree to the number of people who are able
to be mobilized with one political act.
Israel’s manpower may be one of the most underestimated factors of its
military power. The ability to mobilize 2.9 million people, roughly 40% of
Israel’s population, who are actually fit for service, is comparable to the largest
country in the world. China has 45.6% of its population, which is roughly
1 billion people, ready and fit for service. The United States has 37.6% of its
over 300 million people fit for service.12 The largest country in the world and
arguably the strongest military power in the world have relatively equal sizes in
‘reserves’ in terms of population percentages with the 99th largest country in
the world.13 While when facing other states in battle, percentage of population
ready for service bears little weight in the outcome-because smaller populations
will still produce smaller cohorts of soldiers- the comparable percentages paint
a picture of Israel’s priorities and their development of society’s preparedness
for military engagement. To have 40% of an entire state’s populace ready to
mobilize indicates a society where preparation for military engagements is a
way of life and not unusual to the common people. It is this kind of society
that is ready for battle before it arrives at their doorstep.
10
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Technological Developments
In a world where technology has become its own language, states with the
greatest technological advances tend to be perceived as those with the greatest
power. In fact, technology has become one conceptual definition of power in its
comprehensive self. The development of cutting edge technology, particularly
as it relates to military capabilities, gives any state an advantage when faced
with a less developed state. In Israel’s case, they have increasingly become a
military-industrial state, where the state’s marketplace is largely characterized
by companies who primarily focus on the arena of military related technologi
cal advancement.
In 2000, Israel presented its first anti-missile machinery, an interceptor and
destroyer known as the Arrow System. Created through a partnership between
Boeing and Israel Aerospace Industries, the system and its newer versions, is
designed to destroy incoming exo-atmospheric kill vehicles. It has fire-control
radar, a launch control system and a battle management center.14 Following the
production of the Arrow System, the state owned company Rafael Advanced
Defense systems designed the Iron Dome, which became operational in 2011.
This new anti-missile defense system was built to destroy short-range rockets
and artillery shells from four to seventy kilometers away. The system also was
recognized as an effective measure against aircraft at certain altitudes.15 Lastly,
the development of the David’s Sling Weapons system in 2010, a system which
is “designed as an additional layer of defense against ballistic missiles, to add
interception opportunities to the joint U.S.-Israel Arrow Weapon System and
to improve Israel’s defense capabilities against missile threats” gives Israel its
third anti-missile system in fourteen years.16 All three systems are effective at
intercepting and destroying their intended targets.
However, military technology is not solely limited to anti-missile systems.
Because of the innovation and new direction of military attacks in the 21st
century, states have begun to find it necessary to prioritize technology pertain
ing to cyber-security. Israel has within the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) its own
14
“Boeing: Arrow Interceptor,” accessed March 22, 2014, http://www.boeing.com/boeing/
defense-space/space/arrow/.
15
“Iron Dome Missile Defense System | Jewish Virtual Library,” accessed March 22, 2014,
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/IronDome.html.
16
Jeremiah Cushman, “Missile Interceptor Goes Beyond Iron Dome,” Military Periscope
Special Reports, February 21, 2013, 1–1.
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computer training program, Mamram, that thousands of cadets each year
attend in order to become part of the cyber-security team Matzov, or other
intelligence units.17 These young cadets graduate into a country that “attracts
more venture capital investment per person than anywhere else in the world
and exports $25 billion a year in high-tech goods and services”.18 This is one
explanation for why Google, Microsoft, IBM and Intel all have research cen
ters in Israel. Tracing technological development in the cyber-security aspect
is rather challenging due to the secrecy of the field; however, the presence of
those particular companies and the numbers of cadets going through Mamram
give way to the understanding that Israel has devised a strong cyber-security
strategy and system to continue its development in that area.
Economic Strength
In addition to technological development, a state’s economic development
will always play a significant role in its military power. Wealth and power are
undoubtedly linked through a number of ways. Not only does the research and
development of military artillery and technology as well as the sustainment
of forces rely on funding, but the overall health of the state’s economy gives
way to what aspect of government will take top priority. Israel has the twentyseventh largest GDP per capita in the world.19 Israel ranks fourth in the world
for highest percentage of GDP spent on military expenditures, falling behind
South Sudan, Oman and Saudi Arabia.20 Israel’s current economic strength can
be attributed in part to its industry of military technology that generally sells
a great deal of products. The country’s annual export sales for the past eight
years of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) have been roughly $578 million in
U.S. dollars. It is expected to “increase by ten percent yearly” through the year
2020.21 It is primarily the percentage of GDP spent on military expenditures
17
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that makes clear that the Israeli government’s top priority is the strength of its
military and its overall power. As discussed earlier, the concern for power and
military capability may be in part due to its geography in relation to many
Arab Islamic states.
External Support
Between oil politics and religious underpinnings, the region is inflated with
external party interests, economic opportunities and spiritual clashes, all of
which, through traces of history, have been the basis of the world’s character
ization of the region. These factors in the Middle East have been the cause for
centuries of violence and militarization of the region due to power incentives that
external actors and involved states possess. As outside states find the potential
for increased power or economic monopolies in another region, it is argued
by realists in particular, that they will find any excuse to become involved in
the area to take advantage of those opportunities.
For whatever reason they wish to be involved, a number of outside states, par
ticularly the United States, have instilled in their budgets and in their speeches
resounding support for the country of Israel. Since 1985, the United States has
provided Israel with almost $3 billion in grants annually, most of which goes
towards the Israeli military.22 Because of the United States role as a hegemon
in international politics, this bears significant weight on the military power of
Israel. At this point in history, the 99th largest country in the world has the
military powerhouse backing it in almost every situation. Depending on how
one perceives it, this could be a positive or negative thing for the state of Israel.
In terms of its military power, Israel has been able to increase its capabilities
through the funding of the United States. It also can proceed into military
engagements with some faith in America’s support.
Additionally, there is a large deterrent factor in the sense that other states
are less likely to engage militarily with Israel due to its hegemon supporter.
From a skeptical standpoint, the support of the United States is conducive to
complications and tangled alliances that may be tricky as time goes on. History
has already shown that alliances with the United States may not always be
beneficial due to the tendency for the U.S.’s extreme involvement in that state’s
22
“U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel - Open CRS,” September 16, 2010, https://opencrs.com/
document/RL33222/2010-09-16/.
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affairs. Either way, with the support of the United States, both financially and
in its rhetoric, Israel has enough leverage in world politics to be one of the most
influential states with the most potential to gain more power and capabilities.
Implications
Through even a rather brief analysis of Israel’s military status, it is evident that
one of the top priorities of this specific state is its military capability. In contrast
ing numbers and percentages with other powerhouse states, it is understood that
Israel continues to be consistently progressing in the world of military strength.
It has not slowed its military growth nor has it become stagnant in any way.
To fully assess Israel’s military capability, an extensive statistical analysis
would need to be performed. However, for the purposes of this analysis, I posit
that the assessment performed was adequate for the purposes of this discussion.
Between its ability to mobilize huge amounts of manpower, technological devel
opments through contracts with companies like Raytheon, economic strength
due to industry surrounding military technology and external support through
the hefty sums given by the United States, Israel has made its mark on the
world as a country with military as a high priority with few to no intentions
of negating that priority through any means.
Because of this high and increasing military capability, Israel will con
tinue to maintain its status as a major and definitive player in Middle Eastern
politics. As referenced earlier, the militarization of a state, for whatever stated
cause, tends to evoke similar actions in surrounding states and invested states.
As Israel continues this path of military progression, the rest of the region will
respond in kind. Although Israel can and does cite its fear of being wiped off
the face of the earth, a fear evoked by a quote from Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad in 2005 and claims regarding increased military action from
other states, it can also be inferred that its increased militarization are inciting
realistic responses from Arab states.23 Israel must understand that even if their
intentions behind increased and continuous military progression are defense
related, the perceptions increased militarization create could give way to that
Cold War like state down that road, where security in the region heightens to
an unprecedented level.
23
“Truth Squad: Has Iran Said It Wants to Attack Israel?,” CNN, accessed May 5, 2014, http://
www.cnn.com/2011/11/23/politics/truth-squad-iran-israel/index.html.
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Additionally, in the case of the Middle East, it is only natural that states
within the region respond accordingly to the possibility of external actors be
coming involved in the area. Specifically regarding special interest politics, the
country with the largest oil reserves in the world, Saudi Arabia, also has the
seventh largest defense budget in the world and is expected to grow by 7.92%
annually, possibly revealing a correlation between military strength and a high
priority of resource protection.24 In response to increased militarization of one
state, surrounding states undergo threat perception analysis to devise their own
strategy of how to enhance military capability and preparedness as a precaution
to possible danger. As militarization continues, the region increasingly moves
closer to reaching a Cold War like status, leaving states in a Prisoner’s Dilemma
concerning how to respond to possible threats without entering into a period
of unprecedented heightened security.
Israel’s military capability is superior to that of other states. What it chooses
to do with that increased military power will define oil politics and religious
interactions in the Middle East for the next decade. Those decisions will also
have an effect on how the country is perceived by external states, as well as
its sources and levels of funding for militaristic endeavors. Military capability,
though difficult to measure through quantitative analysis, plays a large role in
world politics. In the Middle East, a region so defined by special interest politics
and religious underpinnings, military capability continues to be the impetus
by which Israel will thrive in the next decade.
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